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Abstract 
 
A country that experiences a shortage of workers with particular skills naturally considers two 
responses: import skills or produce them. Skill import may result in large-scale migration, 
which will not be to the liking of the natives. Skill production will require financial 
incentives, which will not be to the liking of the ministry of finance. In this paper we suggest 
a third response: impose a substantial migration admission fee, “import” fee-paying workers 
regardless of their skills, and use the revenue from the fee to subsidize the acquisition of the 
required skills by the natives. We calculate the minimal fee that will remedy the shortage of 
workers with particular skills with fewer migrants than under the skill “import” policy.  
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1. Introduction 
When a country faces a shortage of workers with particular skills, it may consider an “import” 
of workers of the type needed, or it may seek to encourage (subsidize) the “production” of the 
needed skills domestically. Each of these responses has a downside: direct “import” may 
result in substantial migration, and that may not be liked by the natives; subsidies require 
financing, possibly by means of higher taxation. In this paper, we propose and study a third 
response, which works as follows: the country introduces an admission fee (at a level that will 
not curb migration); it accepts foreign workers with any skills as long as they pay the fee; and 
it uses the fee revenues to subsidize the acquisition of the necessary skills by natives.  
We study the attractiveness of an admission fee policy in comparison with the direct 
“import” policy. To this end we construct a model in which individuals in country H (for 
“host”) choose to acquire one of two skill types; as an illustrative example, we resort to skill 
types labeled “managers” and “scientists.”1 Working as a scientist confers prestige and 
generates externalities that boost the productivity of H’s entire workforce.2 By prestige we 
mean social status. Working as a manager does not confer prestige nor does it generate 
production externalities. Individuals vary in the importance that they attach to prestige. We 
refer to this variation as a difference in the desire for prestige. We begin by calculating the 
market equilibrium in a setting in which migration is not allowed. In the equilibrium, 
managers earn more than scientists; this is a market “compensation” for not enjoying 
occupational prestige.3 We show that from the perspective of H’s social planner, the market 
equilibrium is inefficient: too few individuals take up science, and the share of scientists in 
the workforce is lower than socially optimal. We then let H open up to migration, where entry 
is made conditional on payment of a substantial fee. We assume that the wage gain from 
migration for managers is considerably greater than that for scientists. In the presence of a 
                                                 
1 We stress that the reference to scientists and managers is a “working terminology.” We can replace scientists 
with Skill Type I, and managers with Skill Type II. We can use the differentiating characteristics of the two 
types as delineated in the text, and then provide examples such as technicians and supervisors, engineers and 
MBAs, and so on.  
2 Empirical evidence that skills such as science generate high production externalities is in Peri et al. (2014, 
2015). 
3 According to data released by the US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm), among the major occupational groups in the US in 2016, 
Management Occupations (classification 11) ranked top with an annual mean wage of $118,020. This is 
substantially higher than the mean wages in Computer and Mathematical Occupations (classification 15), 
$87,880, and in Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations (classification 19), $72,930. 
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high admission fee, this wage gain differential results in the migration of only managers. We 
show that using a sufficiently high revenue from the admission fee to subsidize the acquisition 
of scientific skills by the natives can enable H to attain the socially optimal share of scientists 
in its workforce, as well as to obtain that objective with fewer migrants than under the direct 
“import” policy.  
Our analysis contributes to the current policy debate in the US regarding alternative 
schemes to the H-1B visa quotas (Becker 2011, Sparber 2016, Stark et al. 2017).4 A drawback 
of the ongoing policy discussion is a lack of theoretical models that compare and rank 
alternative policies. The analysis undertaken in this paper provides an example of how a 
theoretical perspective can influence policy formation.  
In Section 2 we consider country H prior to migration. We model the choice of skill 
type, characterize the equilibrium skill type distribution, and compare this distribution with 
the distribution favored by the social planner. In Section 3 we trace the consequences of H 
opening up to migration under an admission fee, and calculate the minimal fee for which this 
policy is preferable to the direct “import” policy. In Section 4 we test for robustness which 
reveals that the results reported in Sections 2 and 3 hold under alternative formulations of the 
production function and of the distribution of the desire for prestige. A discussion and 
conclusions are in Section 5.  
 
2. A model of production and skill acquisition in a country closed to migration 
A developed country H is populated by a continuous set of individuals (workers) of measure 
one who derive utility from consumption and prestige. At the beginning of their single period 
of life, the individuals decide which skill type to acquire. There are two skill types to choose 
from: science, S, and management, M. The individuals differ in their desire for prestige. The 
utility function of individual j whose skill type is ,t S M  is  
  j jt tu c t   ,  (1) 
                                                 
4 The H-1B is a US visa that allows US employers to employ foreign workers in specialty occupations for a 
period of up to six years. 
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where 
tc  denotes the consumption of an individual of type t, 
j  measures the individual’s 
desire for prestige, and ( )t  is a function such that ( ) 1S   and ( ) 0M   implying that 
science is socially prestigious but management is not. The desire for prestige,  , is a random 
variable uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] with density function ( ) 1f    and 
cumulative distribution function ( )F    for [0,1]  . The variation of   across the 
individuals represents the idea that the desire for prestige depends on individual-specific 
characteristics such as personality, values, and family background. The consumption of an 
individual of type t is equal to his earnings which, in turn, are based on his wage rate, 
tw , 
minus the cost of skill acquisition, k, namely 
t tc w k  . (The cost of skill acquisition is the 
same for the two skill types.) 
Of the two skill types, an individual chooses the one that confers higher utility. 
Recalling (1), that ( ) 1S  , and that ( ) 0M  , scientific skills will be preferred to 
managerial skills when j
S Mw k w k     or, equivalently, when 
j
M Sw w   . If 
j
M Sw w   , then managerial skills will be preferred to scientific skills. Denoting by 
M Sw w    the threshold desire for prestige, the supply of scientists, SL , and the supply of 
managers, 
ML , are 
 Pr( ) 1 ( ) 1
j
SL F          and ML  . (2) 
A large number of identical competitive firms employ scientists and managers to 
produce H’s consumption good, which they sell at a unit price. The production of firm i, iY , 
is 
    i i iS S S M S MY a L L a L L     ,  (3) 
where i
tL  is the size of the workforce of type t employed by firm i, and Ma , Sa , and   are 
constants such that 0M Sa a   and 1 0M Sa a     . The externalities generated by 
scientists, 
SL , depend on the share of scientists in the workforce, 
S
S
S M
L
L
L L


, where 
i
t t
i
L L  denotes the aggregate size of the workforce of type t.  
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2.1. Market equilibrium 
From the perspective of a single firm, the marginal product of a worker of type t is a constant 
t Sa L . In equilibrium, the marginal product of workers of type t is equal to their market 
wage, .t S ta L w 
5 Because the profit maximizing firm will employ any number of 
workers of type t as long as 
t S ta L w  , the distribution of the workforce between the two 
skill types is determined by the supply side. On inserting 
M M Sw a L   and S S Sw a L   
in 
M Sw w   , it follows that in equilibrium, the threshold desire for prestige is 
*
M Sa a   , where an asterisk indicates the market equilibrium value of a variable. The 
equilibrium supply of scientists, *
SL , and the equilibrium supply of managers, 
*
ML , are  
 * *1SL    and 
* *
ML  , (4) 
and the equilibrium share of scientists in H’s workforce is * *1SL   . By inserting this share 
into 
t t Sw a L  , we get the equilibrium values of the wages of scientists and managers, 
respectively * *(1 )S Sw a      and 
* *(1 )M Mw a     , where 
* *
M Sw w .  
 
2.2. The social planner’s choice 
Let there be a social planner whose objective is to obtain a distribution of H’s workforce 
between the two skill types that will maximize the welfare of the natives. This welfare is 
measured by the utilitarian social welfare function 
 
1
0
( ) ( )j j j j j jM SW u f d u f d


      .  (5) 
We denote by **
M Sa a     the value of   that maximizes (5) (a derivation of 
**
M Sa a     is in the following proof of Claim 1), where two asterisks indicate an 
optimal value of a variable under the social planner’s choice. We state and prove the 
following claim. 
                                                 
5 In equilibrium we cannot have that 
t S t
a L w   because then firms will not employ workers at all. And 
t S t
a L w   is not possible either because then the firms’ zero-profit condition is violated. 
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Claim 1. The social planner’s optimal share of scientists in the workforce is higher than the 
corresponding market equilibrium share of scientists in the workforce, namely ** *
S SL L . 
Proof: Because 1S ML L  , we have that 
** ** **1S SL L     and that 
* * *1S SL L    . Thus, 
for ** *
S SL L  to hold, it suffices that 
** *  . Utilizing j j
S Su w k    , 
j
M M Mu u w k   , 
t t Sw a L  , and 1SL   , we can rewrite the social welfare function in (5) as 
  
1
1 ( )j j jM SW a a f d k

           . The first-order condition for the maximization 
of (5) is given by ** 0M S
W
a a  


    

 which, when solved for ** , yields 
**
M Sa a    
*
M Sa a   . The second-order condition for a maximum at 
**   is 
met: 
2
2
1 0
W


  

. Q.E.D. 
Claim 1 implies that if the social planner has his way, he will see to it that the number 
of individuals taking up science will be greater than the number of individuals taking up 
science in the market equilibrium.  
 
3. Correcting for the market inefficiency by introducing and utilizing an admission fee 
Suppose that in order to alleviate the shortage of scientists, H opens up to migration from F 
(for “foreign”) by workers of any skill type, conditional on payment of an admission fee. Just 
like the workforce in H, the workforce in F is assumed to consist of managers and scientists. 
We also assume that the wages paid to scientists and managers in F, which are exogenous to 
the model, are proportionately lower than the corresponding wages paid to scientists and 
managers in H, *F
t tw w , ,t S M , 0 1  , that the prestige “premium” for working as a 
scientist is the same in F as it is in H, and that the admission fee is the only cost of migration.6 
Thus, recalling that * *
M Sw w , it follows that the gain for managers from migration is larger 
than the gain for scientists from migration: 
 * *F F
M M S Sw w w w   .  (6) 
                                                 
6 The idea that migration is motivated not only by a preference for higher earnings (consumption) but also by a 
desire to obtain gains in terms of social prestige is presented in Fan and Stark (2011). 
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H sets the admission fee, x, in order to draw on the receipts from the fee to subsidize the 
acquisition of scientific skills by natives.7 To this end, it naturally prefers to introduce a high 
fee. It follows from (6) that when the admission fee is set at the highest feasible level, namely 
when it is set slightly below the gain for a manager from migration, * F
M Mw w   , 0  , 
then only managers will find it desirable to migrate; scientists will be discouraged because for 
them the net gain from migration is negative. In the remainder of this paper we assume that H 
sets the fee at * *F F
M M M Mx w w w w     , which results in migration only by managers.
8   
When the acquisition of scientific skills is subsidized, the utility of scientist j is given 
not by j j
S Su w k     as before but, rather, by (1 )
j j
S Su w k s     , where s is the fraction 
of the cost of the acquisition of scientific skills paid for by the subsidy. For example, the 
subsidy can take the form of stipends and lower fees for the study of science subjects. The 
utility of a manager remains unchanged at 
M Mu w k  . When (1 )
j
S Mw k s w k      or, 
rearranged, when j
M Sw w sk    , scientific skills will be preferred to managerial skills. 
Using superscript ef to indicate a variable under an admission (entrance) fee, and denoting the 
threshold desire for prestige by ef
M Sw w sk    , the supply of (native) scientists, 
ef
SL , and 
the supply of (native and migrant) managers, ef
M ML Q , are given by  
 1ef efSL    and 
ef ef
M M ML Q Q   , (7) 
where MQ  is the number of migrant managers admitted by H.  
As already mentioned, the firms do not have a preference between employing a native 
worker and a migrant worker and, as noted in Sub-section 2.1, the firms will be pleased to 
employ any number of workers of type t as long as ef
t t Sw a L  , where 
ef
ef S
S ef ef
S M M
L
L
L L Q

 
 
is the share of scientists in H’s workforce under the admission fee. We assume that H 
                                                 
7 Alternatively, without changing any of our results, we could assume that the firms that employ migrant workers 
pay the admission fee, rather than the migrants. The firms will then pass on the fee to the migrants, offering 
wage 
*
t
w x . The reason for that is that because for the firm to be indifferent between employing a native 
worker and a migrant worker - a condition that has to hold in equilibrium - the overall cost for a firm of 
employing a native worker has to be the same as the overall cost for a firm of employing a migrant worker.  
8 Setting the admission fee at 
* F
M M
x w w     is optimal for H: a fee 
* F
M M
x w w   will yield revenue that is 
lower than the revenue yielded by a fee 
* F
M M
x w w  ; and a fee 
* F
M M
x w w   will result in reluctance of F 
managers to migrate.  
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maintains a balanced budget, which requires that the subsidy bill is equal to the admission fee 
revenue, namely ef
M SxQ skL . On substitution for 
ef
SL  from (7), the balanced budget 
requirement is 
 (1 )efMxQ sk   .  (8) 
On rewriting (8) and recalling that t t Sw a L   and that 
*
M Sa a   , the equilibrium 
condition for the distribution of the individuals between the skill types, ef
M Sw w sk    , 
becomes  
 *
1
efM
ef
xQ
 

 

.  (9) 
Solving (9) for ef  yields 9 
 
*
* 21 1 (1 ) 4
2 2
ef
MxQ

 

    .  (10) 
From (10) we see that 1ef efSL    increases with x and with MQ : obviously, the higher the 
admission fee that can be levied on migrant managers, and the larger the number of managers 
who enter H, the higher the fee revenue available to support natives taking up science.  
Suppose that of the two policies, “importing” managers under an admission fee and 
directly “importing” scientists, H prefers the policy that requires fewer migrants. To this end, 
we have to calculate the number of migrants needed to attain the same share of scientists in 
H’s workforce under the two policies. We denote by 
SQ  the number of migrant scientists 
admitted under direct “import,” and by 
q
q S S
S q q
S M S
L Q
L
L L Q


 
 the share of scientists in H’s 
workforce under direct “import,” where superscript q indicates a variable under a direct 
“import” policy. We state and prove the following claim.  
                                                 
9 Formally, there are two solutions to (9). The solution that is ignored is not feasible because it is outside the 
interval [0,1]  . We note that because [0,1]
ef
  , then for a high enough fee revenue, namely for 
*
M
xQ  , 
the lower constraint on 
ef
  will bind, namely 0
ef
  . 
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Claim 2. If *1Sx Q    , then the share of scientists in H’s workforce obtained by the 
“import” of 
SQ  scientists under direct “import” can also be attained by the “import” of 
M SQ Q  managers under an admission fee. 
Proof. We first show that if *1Sx Q    , then 
ef q
S SL L  for M SQ Q . Because 
1ef ef q qS M S ML L L L    , we have that 
1
ef
ef S
S
M
L
L
Q


 and that 
1
q
q S S
S
S
L Q
L
Q



. Assuming that 
M SQ Q , then 
ef q
S SL L  holds as long as 
ef q
S S ML L Q  . Because 1
ef ef
SL   , and because 
under direct “import” the relative attractiveness of the two skill types is the same as in the no-
migration setting, namely because * *1qS SL L    , 
ef q
S S ML L Q   can be rewritten as  
 * ef
MQ   .  (11) 
Substituting (10) into the left-hand side of (11) yields  
 
*
* 21 1 (1 ) 4
2 2
M MxQ Q



     .  (12) 
From (12), taking simple algebraic steps,10 it follows that *1Mx Q     or, because 
M SQ Q , that 
 *1Sx Q    .  (13) 
We now show that if *1Sx Q    , then 
ef q
S SL L  for some M SQ Q . If 
*1Sx Q    , then 
because ef q
S SL L  for M SQ Q , and because 
*ef q
S S SL L L   for 0MQ  , it follows from the 
continuity of ef
SL  in MQ  that 
ef q
S SL L  for some M SQ Q . Q.E.D. 
Let the number of scientists admitted under direct “import” be set at a level that yields 
the optimal share of scientists in the workforce, * **q
S SL L . What is then the minimum level of 
admission fee that will make H prefer the policy of “importing” managers under an admission 
                                                 
10 Multiplying both sides of (12) by 2 and then adding to each side 
*
1   transforms (12) to 
* 2 *(1 ) 4 2 1M MxQ Q      . On taking both sides to the power of 2, the latter inequality becomes 
* 2 2 * * 2
(1 ) 4 4 4 (1 ) (1 )M M MxQ Q Q         . Subtracting 
* 2
(1 )  from both sides and then dividing 
throughout by 
M
Q  transforms the inequality to 
*
1Mx Q    . 
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fee to the direct “import” of scientists? Because 
* *
*
* *
1
1
q
q S S S
S q q
S M S S
L Q Q
L
L L Q Q
  
 
  
 and 
because ** **1SL   , setting 
* **q
S SL L  requires that  
 
*
**1 1
1
S
S
Q
Q


 
 

.  (14) 
Recalling that *
M Sa a    and that 
**
M Sa a    , solving (14) for SQ  yields  
 
**S
Q


 .  (15) 
Thus, if *
**
1x



   , then fewer migrants are needed to attain the optimal share of 
scientists in H’s workforce under an admission fee than under direct “import,” namely 
* * **ef q
S S SL L L   for some **M SQ Q


  . 
 
4. Robustness of the preceding results to an alternative constellation of assumptions 
In this section we show that the results reported in Sections 2 and 3 can be obtained under 
alternative assumptions. In the preceding sections we drew on a simple production function 
with no complementarity between skill types, and we assumed that the individuals’ desire for 
prestige,  , is distributed uniformly on the interval [0,1]. To demonstrate qualitative 
equivalence under an alternative modeling protocol, we now admit complementarity, 
resorting instead of (3) to a CRS Cobb-Douglas production function 
 1i i i
S S MY L L L
   ,  (16) 
where 
SL
  measures the externalities generated by scientists, 0 1   is a constant, and we 
assume that   is defined over the interval [0, ]E  with a general density function ( )f   and a 
general cumulative function ( )F  , such that ( ) ( ) 0F f    ; thus, the distribution is not 
necessarily uniform. For the special case 
1
( )f
E
   and 1E  , the formulation of the desire 
for prestige is as in Section 2, implying that the present representation is more general.   
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Under these formulations, the first-order conditions for profit maximization are 
 
1
/i iS S M Sw L L L


  and  (1 ) /i iM S S Mw L L L
  . Dividing Mw  by Sw , we derive the 
relative demand for workers, 
1
i
SM
i
S M
Lw
w L



 . Because, as already noted, the firms are 
identical and employ scientists and managers at the same ratio, the market ratio is the same as 
the ratio of a single firm, 
1 SM
S M
Lw
w L



 . Thus, the market wages of scientists and of 
managers are given, respectively, by  
1
/S S M Sw L L L


  and  (1 ) /M S S Mw L L L
  , 
and the difference between these wages is 
 1
1
M S S M
M S
w w L L
L L
          
 
.  (17) 
As in Section 2, on the supply side, the equilibrium condition for the distribution of 
H’s workforce between the two skill types is given by 
M Sw w    and, thus, the supply of 
scientists is 1 ( )SL F   , and the supply of managers is ( )ML F  . Inserting these levels in 
(17), it follows that in equilibrium 
 
* * * 1
* *
1
(1 ( )) ( )
( ) 1 ( )
F F
F F
      
 
      
 
.  (18) 
In the current setup, the social planner’s objective is to choose   so as to maximize  
 
0
( ) ( )
E
j j j j j j
M SW u f d u f d


         
or equivalently, when we utilize j j
S Su w k    , 
j
M M Mu u w k   ,  
1
/S S M Sw L L L


 , 
 (1 ) /M S S Mw L L L
  , 1 ( )SL F   , and ( )ML F  , the social planner’s objective is to 
maximize  
 1(1 ( )) ( ) ( )
E
j j jW F F f d k  

         .  (19) 
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From the corresponding first-order condition for a maximum, 
** ** 1 ** ** **
** **
1
(1 ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
( ) 1 ( )
F F f f
F F
         
 
        
 
, we get 11  
 ** ** ** 1
** **
1
(1 ( )) ( )
( ) 1 ( )
F F
F F
       
 
       
 
.  (20) 
We note that when ** *  , where *  is now given by (18), the equality in (20) is violated: 
the left-hand side is then bigger than the right-hand side: * * * 1 * 1(1 ( )) ( )F F           . 
This implies that *  is too large to satisfy (20), and that the social planner will optimally 
choose ** *  . Thus, the socially desirable number of scientists in H is higher than the 
market equilibrium number, namely ** ** * *1 ( ) 1 ( )S SL F F L      , and so is the share of 
scientists in H’s workforce, 
**
** ** * *
** **
1 ( ) 1 ( )SS S
S M
L
L F F L
L L
      

. 
Suppose now that in order to alleviate the shortage of scientists, H opens up to 
migration subject to the payment of an admission fee. We assume that (6) continues to hold; 
that H sets the fee at * F
M Mx w w   which results in only managers finding it worthwhile to 
migrate; and that in a manner like the one presented in Section 3, H uses the proceeds from 
the fee to subsidize the acquisition of scientific skills by natives. Under these assumptions, the 
distribution of the workforce of H between the two skill types is determined, as in Section 3, 
by ef ef ef
M Sw w sk    , where sk is the subsidy per scientist rendered by the balanced budget 
constraint, ef
M SxQ skL . On inserting 
ef ef ef
M Sw w sk    , 
ef
M SxQ skL , 1 ( )
ef ef
SL F   , and 
( )ef efM ML F Q   in (17), the market equilibrium condition is  
 * * * 1
* * *
1
(1 ( )) ( ( ) )
1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
ef ef efM
Mef ef ef
M
xQ
F F Q
F F Q F
      
  
        
   
.  (21) 
Under direct “import,” the equivalent market equilibrium condition is 
                                                 
11 The second-order condition for a maximum, 
** ** ** 1 **
** 2 ** ** ** 2
(1 ) 2( )(1 ) ( )(1 )
( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( ) 1 0,
( ) ( )(1 ( )) (1 ( ))
f F F f
F F F F
           
   
   
       
     
 
   
     
 holds. 
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 * * * 1
* *
1
(1 ( ) ) ( )
( ) 1 ( )
q q q
S q q
S
F Q F
F F Q
      
 
       
  
.  (22) 
Although it is analytically impossible to express *ef  and *q  in closed forms, we can gain 
some insight into the conditions needed for the migration of managers under an admission fee 
to be preferred to the migration of scientists under direct “import,” by limiting attention to 
migration that is fairly small in size. To this end, we calculate the response of *ef  to a 
marginal increase in 
MQ , and the response of 
*q  to a marginal increase in 
SQ . Referring to 
(21), we define  
 
* * * *
*
* 1 * 1
( , ) (1 )(1 ( )) ( ( ) )
1 ( )
(1 ( )) ( ( ) ) ,
ef ef ef efM
M Mef
ef ef
M
xQ
G Q F F Q
F
F F Q
  
  
    

  
 
  
     

  
  (23) 
and referring to (22), we define  
 
 
* * * *
* 1 * 1
( , ) (1 )(1 ( ) ) ( )
(1 ( ) ) ( ) .
q q q q
S S
q q
S
H Q F Q F
F Q F
  
  
    
  
 
  
    
  
  (24) 
Because in the market equilibrium we have that *( , ) 0ef MG Q   and that 
*( , ) 0q SH Q  , we 
can apply to these functions the implicit function theorem. This yields, respectively, 
*
*
/
/
ef
M
ef
M
G Qd
dQ G


 
 
 
 and 
*
*
/
/
q
S
q
S
G Qd
dQ G


 
 
 
. Because  
* 1 * 1
*
(1 )(1 )(1 ( )) ( ( ) ) 0,
1 ( )
ef ef
M Mef
M
G x
Q F F Q
Q F
     

          
 
  
* * * * 1
* * 2
* 2 * * * 2
1 ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( ( ) )
(1 ( ))
(1 ) (1 )(2 ) (1 )
0,
( ( ) ) (1 ( ))( ( ) ) (1 ( ))
ef ef ef efM
Mef ef
ef ef ef ef
M M
xQG
f f F F Q
F
F Q F F Q F
     
 
       
   
      
 
     
    
    
   
* 2 *
* *
(1 ( ) ) ( )
(1 )( )(1 ( ) ) (1 ) ( ) 0,
q q
S
S
q q
S
H
F Q F
Q
F Q F
   
       
      

          
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and because 
* * * 1
*
* 2 * * * 2
1 ( )(1 ( ) ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )(2 ) (1 )
0,
( ) (1 ( ) ) ( ) (1 ( ) )
q q q
Sq
q q q q
S S
H
f F Q F
F F Q F F Q
    

       
   
     

     
    
    
  
we get that 
*
0
ef
M
d
dQ

 , and that 
*
0
q
S
d
dQ

 . Recalling that the shares of scientists in the 
workforce of H under an admission fee and under direct “import” are given, respectively, by 
1
ef ef
ef S S
S ef ef
S M M M
L L
L
L L Q Q
 
  
 and by 
1
q q
q S S S S
S q q
S M S S
L Q L Q
L
L L Q Q
 
 
  
, then, in the neighborhood 
of 0S MQ Q  , the migration of managers under an admission fee will be preferable to the 
migration of scientists under direct “import” if 
* *
0 0M S
ef q
S S
M SQ Q
L L
Q Q
 
 

 
. Because 
* * *
2
1
1 (1 )
ef ef ef
S S S
M M M M
L L L
Q Q Q Q
 
 
   
, because 
* * *
2
11
1 (1 )
q q q
S S S
S S S S
L L L
Q Q Q Q
  
 
   
, and because for 
0S MQ Q   we have that 
* * *ef q
S S SL L L  , then 
* *
0 0M S
ef q
S S
M SQ Q
L L
Q Q
 
 

 
 holds if 
* *
0 0
1
M S
ef q
S S
M SQ Q
L L
Q Q
 
 
 
 
. In turn, because 
* * *
*(1 ( )) ( )
ef ef ef
efS
M M M
L F
f
Q Q Q
 

   
  
  
, and 
because 
* * *
*(1 ( )) ( )
q q q
qS
S S S
L F
f
Q Q Q
 

   
  
  
, then 
* *
0 0
1
M S
ef q
S S
M SQ Q
L L
Q Q
 
 
 
 
 holds if 
* *
*
0 0
( ) 1
M S
ef q
M SQ Q
f
Q Q
 

 
  
   
  
 
. Recalling that 
*
0
ef
M
d
dQ

  and that 
*
0
q
S
d
dQ

 , we note that 
* *
*
0 0
( ) 1
M S
ef q
M SQ Q
f
Q Q
 

 
  
   
  
 
 holds if 
*
0M
ef
M Q
Q




 is large enough. Because 
* * *
*(1 ( )) ( ) 0
ef ef ef
efSL F f
x x x
 

   
   
  
, (where the sign of 
*ef
SL
x


 is due to 
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*
* * *
/ 1
0
/ 1 ( ) /
ef
M
ef ef ef
Qd G x
dx G F G

  
 
    
    
), we infer that for a large enough 
admission fee, 
*
0M
ef
M Q
Q




 will be such that 
* *
*
0 0
( ) 1
M S
ef q
M SQ Q
f
Q Q
 

 
  
   
  
 
 will hold.  
We see then that drawing on the assumption of complementarity between skill types, 
as done in the production function (16), does not change qualitatively our main result: there is 
a threshold level of the admission fee such that for higher fees the migration of managers 
under an admission fee is preferable to the migration of scientists under direct “import” in the 
sense that the former policy delivers the same share of scientists in H’s workforce as the latter 
policy, yet requires for that purpose fewer migrants.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
An intuitive response to the shortage of workers with particular skills is to “import” workers 
of the needed skill type. We have outlined an alternative policy: impose a high migration 
admission fee, allow migrants to self-select in response to the fee, and use the proceeds from 
the fee to support the domestic “production” of the needed skills. The fee policy will induce 
migration of workers for whom the increase in earnings upon migration (the returns from 
migration) are the highest; in our illustrative example, these are “managers.” There is no need 
to import directly that which is scarce.  
The models presented in the preceding sections are crisp in the sense that they guide a 
choice between two distinct policies: one relying on “import” of the needed workers, the other 
relying on (possibly adverse) self-selection of the migrants whose admission fee subsidizes 
the domestic production of the workers in short supply. The stark difference in the 
composition of migration by skill type yielded by our models may not, however, obtain in 
practice. In the real world, we might observe high-earning workers of more than one skill type 
responding to the fee. These workers can include workers of the skill type needed in H. The 
results reported for the case in which the migrants coming to H under an admission fee are not 
of the skill type needed in H will naturally carry through to a case in which some of the 
migrants are of the needed skill type.  
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For some skill types, skills acquired in F are less productive in H than in F. Workers 
with such skill types would require costly retraining on migration, which could discourage 
them from migrating. If the workers who require retraining were managers, then our proposed 
policy could seemingly appear less appealing. When H announces that it will admit any fee-
paying migrant, those who seek to migrate will most likely prepare themselves for the move. 
They will choose specialties and areas of expertise that will smoothly transfer to H, and 
minimize the need for retraining. For example, there are numerous MBA programs, many of 
them run in migrant-originating countries by institutions based in migrant-destination 
countries and, therefore, it is not difficult to pre-tailor and align managerial skills in order to 
ensure productive work on arrival. In addition, suppose that there is a spectrum of managers, 
ranging from those whose training and background can result in a swift transition into 
productive work at destination, and those who are at the opposite end of the spectrum. 
Bringing in the former is what we have in mind. Thus, there is no good reason to assume that 
migrant managers will require more intensive training than, say, migrant scientists.  
Our modeling abstracts from several considerations related to dynamics. When a time 
dimension is brought to bear, a concern could be raised that whereas importing delivers an 
instant supply, endogenous skill acquisition is time-consuming. In the short run, with an 
admission fee, H could experience a decline in the share of scientists in its workforce 
following the arrival of migrant managers, given the lack of locally trained scientists who, 
while responding to the subsidy, have not as yet completed their acquisition of skills. The 
negative effect of domestic skill acquisition in the short run will, however, be small when the 
skill acquisition process is fairly short. And there is a possibility that for reasons such as 
social stigma, native managers will, in response to the arrival of migrant managers, seek to 
switch to science even in the absence of subsidies to do so (Bound et al. 2017). This effect too 
is a dynamic consideration from which our model abstracts. 
 
 16 
 
References 
Becker, G.S. 2011. “The challenge of immigration: A radical solution,” Occasional Paper 
145, Institute of Economic Affairs, London. 
Bound, J., Khanna, G., Morales, N. 2017. “Understanding the economic impact of the H-1B 
program on the U.S.,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 23153, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Fan, C.S., Stark, O. 2011. “A theory of migration as a response to occupational stigma,” 
International Economic Review 52(2), 549-571. 
Peri, G., Shih, K., Sparber, C. 2014. “Foreign STEM workers and native wages and 
employment in U.S. cities,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 
20093, Cambridge, MA. 
Peri, G., Shih, K., Sparber, C. 2015. “STEM workers, H-1B visas, and productivity in US 
cities,” Journal of Labor Economics 33(S1), S225-S255.  
Sparber, C. 2016. “Choosing skilled foreign-born workers: Evaluating alternative methods for 
allocating H-1B work permits,” Society of Labor Economists, Working Paper 17178, 
Chicago, IL. 
Stark, O., Byra, L., Casarico, A., Uebelmesser, S. 2017. “A critical comparison of migration 
policies: Entry fee versus quota,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 66, 91-107. 
 
